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Punishing Ethical Violations:
Aggravating and Mitigating Factors
by H. Patrick Furman

In

the past several years, the Colo-

rado Supreme Court seems to
have increased the severity of
sanctions meted out to lawyers
who violate the Code of Professional Responsibility. The court often rejects the
recommendations of the Grievance
Committee and imposes a harsher sanction than that recommended by the
Committee.
The body of law relating to the punishment of lawyers is growing weekly.
The court uses both case law and the
American Bar Association Standards
for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions ("Standards"),' adopted by the ABA in 1986,
when meting out punishment. The punishment phase of disciplinary proceedings is taking on more of the characteristics of sentencing in a criminal case:
lawyer discipline and criminal sentencing share many of the same underlying
purposes and use many of the same criteria for determining the appropriate
punishment.
This article briefly reviews the general criteria for imposing sanctions that
are set out by the Standards and reviews the factors the court uses, in both
aggravation and mitigation, to determine sanctions against lawyers who violate their ethical obligations. Finally,
the article looks at probation as an alternative in sanctioning lawyers.

Column Ed.: Craig Fleishman of
Gelt, Fleishman & Sterling, P.C.,
Denver-861-1000

General Considerations
It is important to note at the outset
that the punishment recommended by
the Grievance Committee is advisory
only. The court "has the independent responsibility to determine appropriate
discipline." 2 The court often imposes a
sanction different (and, perhaps, heavier) than the recommended sanction. In
doing so, the court relies heavily on the
Standards. The court's repeated use of
the Standards indicates the justices'
agreement with the principle, set out in
the Standards, that truly effective
lawyer discipline requires adherence to
a clearly defined set of criteria in determining punishment.3
The primary goal of the sanctioning
system adopted in the Standards is to
protect the public. The other goals are to
protect the integrity of the legal system,
insure the proper administration of justice, deter future unethical behavior by
the lawyer involved, rehabilitate the
lawyer if rehabilitation is appropriate
and educate the public and the profession generally, in order to deter unethical behavior among all members of the
profession.4 These goals are similar to
many of the purposes of the Colorado
Criminal Code in CRS § 18-1-102.5 with
respect to sentencing. The appropriate
sanction is determined with reference to
these goals.
The Standards set out a model that
courts may follow when imposing sanctions. The model requires the court to
answer four questions:
1) what ethical duty the lawyer violated;

2) what the lawyer's mental state
was;
3) what the extent was of the potential or actual injury caused by the
conduct; and
4) whether there are any aggravating or mitigating circumstances.'
Standards 4.0 through 8.4 provide the
sanctions that generally are appropriate
for the various types of violations. The
aggravating and mitigating circumstances are then used to justify deviations from that sanction. Again, there is
a similarity to parts of the model used in
sentencing in criminal caseS6 and to the
principle that mens rea is part of the
culpability requirement in criminal cases.7 The Colorado Supreme Court generally follows this model. Each of these
four main factors is discussed briefly in
the following section.

The Four Main Factors
The nature of the duty that is violated
has a major impact on the type of sanction imposed. The duties lawyers owe to
clients (such as loyalty, diligence, competence and candor) are considered the
most important duties,8 and violations
of these duties generally are punished
more severely under the Standards
than are violations of duties owed to the
profession or to the justice system.
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The mental state of the lawyer who
commits the violation is the second major factor in determining the appropriate sanction. The mental states described in the Standards are those of
"intent, knowledge, and negligence."9 As
in criminal law, an intentional violation
of an ethical duty is considered more
serious than a knowing violation of an
ethical duty, which, in turn, is considered more serious than a negligent violation. For example, a lawyer who deals
with client property improperly normally will be suspended if he or she acted
knowingly, but only publicly censuredo
if the lawyer acted negligently."
The third major factor is the extent of
the actual or potential injury caused by
the unethical action of the lawyer. It is
important to remember that actual injury need not have occurred; potential
injury is just as serious as the actual infliction of injury. For example, as noted
above, the Standards recommend a public censure of a lawyer who deals negligently with client property. The recommended sanction is reduced to an admonition 2 if the actions of the lawyer
caused little or no actual or potential injury to the client.13 '
The final major factor to be considered when imposing sanctions is the
presence of aggravating or mitigating
factors. The balance of this article is devoted to a discussion of these factors as
used by the Colorado Supreme Court in
disciplining lawyers.

Aggravating and
Mitigating Factors
Aggravating factors under the Standards are those considerations that may
justify an increase in the degree of discipline to be imposed. The ten factors listed in Standard 9.2 are (1) prior disciplinary offenses, (2) dishonest or selfish
motive, (3) a pattern of misconduct, (4) a
multiplicity of offenses, (5) obstructing
the disciplinary process, (6) deceptive
practices in connection with the disciplinary process, (7) a lack of acknowledgement of the wrongful conduct, (8)
the vulnerability of the victim of the
conduct, (9) substantial experience in
the practice of law and (10) indifference
toward making restitution.
Mitigating factors under the Standards are those considerations that may
justify a reduction in the degree of discipline to be imposed. The thirteen factors
listed in Standard 9.3 are (1) the absence of a prior disciplinary record, (2)
the absence of any selfish or dishonest

motive, (3) personal or emotional problems, (4) good faith efforts to make restitution or mitigate the damage caused,
(5) cooperation with the disciplinary
process, (6) inexperience in the practice
of law, (7) character, (8) physical or mental impairment, (9) any delay in the disciplinary process, (10) interim rehabilitation, (11) the imposition of other sanctions, (12) remorse and (13) the remoteness of prior offenses.
Over the past few years, the Colorado
Supreme Court has used these aggravating and mitigating factors extensively in determining the appropriate sanction. No specific weight is assigned to
any factor and, in most cases, more than
one factor is involved. The court engages
in a general balancing of the factors.
The most commonly used factors are
discussed in the following sections.

PriorDisciplinaryRecord
The presence of prior disciplinary offenses is an aggravating factor and the
absence of any prior disciplinary record
is a mitigating factor. The mitigating
value of a "clean record" is significantly
reduced when counsel has only recently
been licensed to practice law.u"Under
Standard 9.32(m), the remoteness in
time of a prior offense is considered a
mitigating factor. However, the Colorado Supreme Court has not accepted
remoteness in time as a mitigator, as
discussed below.
In Colorado, even relatively minor
prior offenses are used in aggravation.
The Colorado Supreme Court has used
prior disciplinary offenses in aggravation when the prior offense was only a
negligent offense punished with a letter
of admonition and private sanction.15
Obviously, the court uses more serious
prior offenses in aggravation, as well.16
The remoteness of the prior disciplinary offense does not appear to be a
mitigating factor in Colorado. The court,
at most, seems to use the remoteness of
a prior offense only to lessen the impact
of what otherwise is considered an aggravating factor. For example, in People
v. Good,'7 the Grievance Committee did
not consider counsel's prior suspension
as an aggravating factor because it was
based on conduct that was from fifteen
to twenty years old. However, the court
held that the prior discipline was still a
relevant factor to be considered in imposing discipline. The court also pointed
out that some of the current disciplinary
offenses were similar to the prior disciplinary offenses and began only two or
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three years after counsel was reinstated
following the initial discipline. 8
Similarly, in People v. Barber,19 the
court rejected the remoteness of the prior disciplinary offense as a mitigating
factor when the prior offense occurred
only three years prior to the offense in
question. The court noted that counsel
had been put on notice, at the time of
the prior offense, that subsequent offenses would bring a harsher sanction.

Dishonest or Selfish Motive
The presence of a dishonest or selfish
motive is an aggravating factor under
the Standards. The absence of the same
is a mitigating factor. A dishonest or
selfish motive usually is evidenced by
an intention to receive a financial benefit.
In People v. Shipp,20 counsel agreed to
pay a jail inmate a referral fee for cases
the inmate referred to the attorney. This
violation of the ban on referral fees established by DR 2-103(B) was aggravated by the intent to secure financial gain.
The court rejected the Grievance Committee recommendation of a public censure and suspended counsel for sixty

days.21
In People v. Franks, counsel took
money from clients, did little or no work,
and then left the country. The court
found that a selfish or dishonest motive
was present and used this finding, along
with other aggravating factors, to disbar
counsel. 22 The absence of a selfish motive has been used a number of times as
a mitigating factor.u

PersonalProblems and Character
The court will consider the presence
of personal or emotional problems as a
mitigating factor. Problems that the
court has considered include financial
difficulties, 4 family tragedieS25 and
physical or mental disabilities, including alcoholism.26
Evidence of such problems or disabilities must be presented to the hearing
panel if the court is to consider them.
Mere argument that they exist will not
suffice.' 7 If substance abuse was a partial cause of the unethical behavior,
counsel's effort to deal with the problem
can mitigate the sanction.?'

Cooperationwith the
DisciplinaryProcess
The Colorado Supreme Court views
cooperation with the disciplinary process as a mitigating factor and non-cooperation as an aggravating factor. Total

1991
1991

non-cooperation, in the form of a failure
to respond to the disciplinary complaint,
will result in the court entering a default judgment and deeming the allegations of the complaint admitted.2 In addition to the effect on the merits of the
grievance, total non-cooperation is an
aggravating factor, and was so viewed
even before the court began using the
Standards.30
Less egregious forms of non-cooperation also will be considered as aggravating factors. A failure to cooperate with
the investigatory stage of the disciplinary process, 3' making misleading statements during the disciplinary proceeding, 32 a delay in cooperating with the
disciplinary process33 and other failures
to cooperate fully34 all have been used as
aggravating factors.
Conversely, cooperation with the disciplinary process can serve to mitigate
the sanction the court imposes.35 Full
and complete cooperation (along with
other mitigating factors) enabled an attorney who otherwise would have been
disbarred to receive only a suspension. 36
While there is no specific value placed
on cooperation as a mitigating factor, it
is a factor that repeatedly has been used
by the court and over which counsel has
some control even after he or she has
committed an ethical violation. Again,
there is a similarity to sentencing in
criminal cases. Both the Colorado37 and
federa 38 sentencing schemes establish
cooperation with the authorities as a mitigating factor.

Length of Practice
Substantial experience in the practice
of law is seen as an aggravating factor
under the Standards, while inexperience in the practice of law is seen as a
mitigating factor. Using the experience
of counsel in fashioning the appropriate
sanction raises these two questions:
why should experience be a factor, and
where does the court draw the line?
Suggesting that experience in practicing law justifies a more severe sanction
has superficial appeal on the theory that
"he (or she) should have known better." However, in this author's opinion,
that theory is erroneous for three reasons. First, a new lawyer, who has just
finished law school and passed the bar
exam (both of which have an ethics component) should be as fully informed of a
lawyer's ethical obligations as a seasoned veteran is. Second, many of the
ethical rules and guidelines are simple
and straightforward proscriptions
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against immoral and illegal acts, such
as stealing and lying. It does not take
years of practice to understand that
committing these types of acts is both
wrong and unethical. Finally, any
lawyer, whether new or experienced,
should have the common sense to seek
help when faced with an issue, ethical
or otherwise, that he or she does not understand.
Nevertheless, the fact is that length of
practice is a factor established by the
Standards and accepted by the Colorado
Supreme Court. Thus, the more practical issue becomes the point at which
counsel moves from being inexperienced
to being experienced. The Standards do
not establish a specific point in time at
which counsel is deemed "experienced,"
nor does the case law. However, some
general boundaries are emerging.
The court has held that an attorney
has "substantial experience," and is subject to aggravation on that basis, when
the attorney had thirteen years of experience.39 At the other end, the court has
held that an attorney with six to eight
years of practicing law is "inexperienced."4
The particular field of practice in
which the misconduct arises can influence the decision as to whether a particular length of time in practice constitutes experience or inexperience. In People v. Pooley,41 the attorney had been
practicing law for eleven years, but had
only been practicing in the specific field
(medical malpractice) in which the problem arose for two years. This level of experience was seen as a mitigating factor.
However, in People v. Nichols,42 two
years of practice was not seen as a mitigating factor because the ethical violation involved a failure "to perform the
most basic legal tasks, not [an] inability
to comprehend the legal issues surrounding those tasks.""

Other Factors Under
The Standards
The Standards consider a pattern of
misconduct and the existence of multiple offenses an aggravating factor. The
court may find a pattern of misconduct
when counsel has violated several disciplinary rules in connection with the representation of a single client or has violated a disciplinary rule in connection
with several clients."
A willingness to make restitution, or
an indifference toward the same, is a
factor the court will consider. Counsel
must indicate voluntarily a willingness

to make restitution. If the restitution is
forced or compelled, Standard 9.4(a)
views the fact of restitution as irrelevant. A refusal to acknowledge the
wrongful nature of the conduct is an aggravating factor and, conversely, the
presence of genuine remorse is a mitigating factor.45
The imposition of other sanctions
against the attorney may affect the
sanction imposed in the disciplinary
proceeding. The one Colorado case directly addressing this issue held that
the imposition of a money judgment directly against counsel in the probate
case that was the subject of the grievance constituted a mitigating factor.46
The Illinois Supreme Court has held
that the imposition of a separate sanction may satisfy the goals of the disciplinary process and, thus, eliminate the
need for any disciplinary action.47
The imposition of sanctions by an attorney discipline body in another jurisdiction also has an impact. The court
generally imposes the same discipline
upon an attorney who is licensed in
another state and is disciplined in the
other jurisdiction, unless one of four
exceptions has been established."
This rule is set forth in Colorado Rules
of Civil Procedure ("C.R.C.P.") Rule
241.17 and also is the procedure recommended by Standard 2.9. The exceptions allow for a different result when
(1) the foreign jurisdiction's procedures
did not comport with due process, (2)
the proof used in the foreign jurisdiction
was so infirm that the court cannot rely
on the foreign jurisdiction's determination, (3) imposition of the same sanction
would be a grave injustice or (4) the misconduct warrants a substantially different form of discipline.49 A sanction imposed on this basis ordinarily will run
concurrently with the sanction imposed
by the other jurisdiction.50
Again, it should be noted that many
of these factors are identical or similar
to many of the factors used by judges
when imposing sentences in criminal
cases.

Miscellaneous Factors
The court is willing to find mitigation
in a factor that is not explicitly mentioned in the Standards. In People v.
Auld,5 the attorney reluctantly agreed
to hold illegal weapons proffered to him
by an undercover police officer posing as
a potential client. When the district attorney offered to drop the criminal
charges if the attorney acted as an infor-
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mant against some of his other clients,
the attorney refused. The court noted
that accepting contraband in exchange
for legal services previously had been
held to merit a one-year suspension,5 2
but that informing on clients previously
had resulted in the even more serious
sanction of a two-year suspension." Balancing the seriousness of this offense
against the refusal to violate the attorney-client privilege, the court held that
a six-month suspension was the appropriate sanction.

Probation as an
Alternative Sanction
Under Standard 2.7 and the commentary following it,
[p]robation is a sanction that allows a
lawyer to practice law under specified
conditions.... Probation is a sanction
that should be imposed when a
lawyer's right to practice law needs to
be monitored or limited rather than
suspended or revoked.
A number of other states have imposed
probation as a sanction in disciplinary
cases. Conditions in these cases have included reports on caseload status," supervision by another lawyer,5 5 periodic
audits of trust accounts, 56 continuing legal education,57 participation in substance abuse programs58 and periodic
mental or physical examinations.5
While the Colorado Supreme Court often bases reinstatement on the fulfillment of certain conditions,6 it does not
use probation as a sanction.
A probationary alternative, in appropriate cases, serves all of the purposes of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Therefore, in this author's opinion, the
court should consider the adoption of a
probationary alternative in ethical violations in Colorado.

Conclusion
The imposition of sanctions on
lawyers who have committed ethical violations can be viewed as analogous to
the imposition of a sentence in a criminal case. The goals of protecting the
public, deterring future misconduct and
rehabilitation are common to both proceedings. Many of the other goals underlying the two proceedings are similar.
The aggravating and mitigating factors established in the Standards and
adopted by the Colorado Supreme Court
also are strikingly similar to the factors
that sentencing courts consider in criminal cases. Counsel facing a disciplinary
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proceeding should take advantage of every opportunity to cooperate with the
disciplinary process and to engage in remedial action in order to mitigate the
severity of the sanction.

NOTES
1. Published by the ABA/The Bureau of

National Affairs, Inc. 1986.
2. People v. Flores, 772 P.2d 610, 614

(Colo. 1989).
3. Standards, Preface at 01:801.
4. Standard 1.1.
5. Standards, Preface at 01:805.
6. See, CRS § 16-11-203, the criteria for
granting probation.
7. CRS § 18-1-501 et seq.
8. Standards, Preface at 01:805.
9. Standard 3.0 and commentary following.
10. The Standards use the term "reprimand" as the equivalent of a public censure
under the Colorado definitions. See, Standard 2.5; C.R.C.P 241.7(3).
11. Standards 4.12, 4.13.
12. Admonition, as used in the Standards
and in this article, includes either a private
censure or an admonition under the Colorado definitions. See, Standard 2.6; C.R.C.P.
241.7(4) and (5).
13. Standards 4.13, 4.14.
14. People v. Garrett, 20 Colo.Law 382
(Feb. 1991) (S.Ct. No. 90SA448, annc'd
12/24190).
15. People v. Macy, 789 P.2d 188 (Colo.
1990).
16. See, e.g., People v. O'Leary, 783 P.2d
843 (Colo. 1989).
17. 790 P.2d 331 (Colo. 1990).
18. Id. at 332.
19. 19 Colo.Law. 2596 (Dec. 1990) (No.
89SA498, annc'd 10/29/90).
20. 793 P.2d 574 (Colo. 1989).
21. Justices Vollack and Erickson dissented
and would have imposed a harsher sanction.
22. 791 P2d 1 (Colo. 1990).
23. See, e.g., People v. Creasey, 19 Colo.
Law. 1725 (Aug. 1990) (No. 90SA80, annc'd
6/25/90); People v. Hensley-Martin, 795 P.2d
262 (Colo. 1990).
24. People v. Shipp, 19 Colo.Law. 1713
(Aug. 1990) (No. 90SA95, annc'd 6/18/90).
25. People v. Vernon, 782 P.2d 745 (Colo.
1989).
26. People v. Kengle, 772 P.2d 605 (Colo.
1989).
27. People v. Dohe, 19 Colo.Law. 2599 (Dec.
1990) (No. 90SA288, annc'd 10/29/90).
28. People v. Smith, 778 P.2d 685 (Colo.
1989).
29. Dohe, supra, note 27; People v. Richards, 748 P.2d 341 (Colo. 1987); People v.
Jackson, 747 P.2d 654 (Colo. 1987).
30. People v. Gross, 543 P.2d 1264 (Colo.
1975).
31. People v. Chappell, 783 P2d 838 (Colo.
1989).

32. Hensley-Martin,supra, note 23.
33. People v. Moya, 19 Colo.Law. 1728

(Aug. 1990) (No. 90SA142, annc'd 6/25/90).
34. Creasey, supra, note 23. See also, Garrett, supra, note 14.
35. Shipp, supra, note 24.
36. People v. Wilber, 796 P.2d 976 (Colo.

1990).
37. CRS § 16-11-203.
38. 18 U.S.C. 3553(e); 28 U.S.C. 994(n).
39. Creasey, supra,note 23.
40. Hensley-Martin,supra,note 23.

41. 774 E2d 239 (Colo. 1990).
42. 796 P.2d 966 (Colo. 1990).
43. Id. at 969. See also, Garrett,supra,
note 14; People v. Lamberson, 20 Colo.Law.
379 (Feb. 1991) (S.Ct. No. 89SA89, annc'd
12/24/90), in which the Supreme Court noted
with apparent approval a Grievance Committee Hearing Board finding that five years'
experience constituted an aggravating factor
when the violations included such obvious offenses as writing checks on an account with
insufficient funds and using one client's
funds to pay another client's expenses.
44. People v. Wyman, 782 P.2d 339 (Colo.
1989); People v. Cuevas, 772 P.2d 610, 614
(Colo. 1989); Kengle, supra,note 26.
45. Creasey,supra, note 23.
46. People v. Sullivan, 20 Colo.Law. 383
(Feb. 1991) (S.Ct. No. 89SA161, annc'd,
12/24190). The three dissenters argued that
this judgment was not a mitigating factor because counsel subsequently declared
bankruptcy They considered the bankruptcy
filing an aggravating factor.
47. In re Lamberis, 443 N.E.2d 549 (Ill.
1982) (expulsion by the school where counsel
was writing his master of laws thesis adequate punishment).
48. People v. Trevino, 20 Colo.Law. 141
(Jan. 91) (No. 90SA311, annc'd 11/13/90);
People v. Gilson, 780 P2d 1088 (Colo. 1989).
49. T-evino, supra, note 48 (harsher sanc-

tion imposed due to nature of conduct).
50. People v. Chatz, 788 P.2d 157 (Colo.

1990).
51. 788 P.2d 1275 (Colo. 1990).
52. People v. Davis, 768 P.2d 1227 (Colo.
1989).
53. Smith, supra, note 28 (two justices
would have disbarred the attorney).
54. The FloridaBar v. Neale, 432 So.2d 50

(Fla. 1980).
55. In re Margos, 285 N.W.2d 541 (N.D.
1971); In re Hessberger, 451 N.E.2d 821 (M.
1983).
56. The FloridaBar v. Montgomery, 418

So.2d 267 (Fla. 1982).
57. The FloridaBar v. Glick, 383 So.2d 267

(Fla. 1982).
58. Tnner v. State Bar, 617 P.2d 486 (Cal.
1980); In re Heath, 678 P2d 736 (Or. 1984).
59. In re McCallum, 289 N.W.2d 146

(Minn. 1980).
60. Maya, suprm, note 33.

